Knowing Entails Believing

I.
The thesis that knowing that some sentence, say, p is true entails believing that p is true, hereafter referred to as the entailment thesis, has recently received much atten tion centering around Colin Radford's attempt to show, pri marily by examples, that it is false.1 Both Keith Lehrer and D. M. Armstrong argue, though in quite different ways, that Radford's examples do not constitute counter examples to the entailment thesis.1 I shall nevertheless show in sections II through VI that neither Lehrer nor Armstrong succeeds in refuting Radford.
Lehrer does not succeed primarily because he merely assumes, as he himself ultimately puts it, that both knowing that p and believing that p require a certain sort of conscious convic tion.1 However, Lehrer does in effect expose a weakness in Rad ford's position which Armstrong tries to exploit. That is, U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the c o n s t r u c t i o n of these four cases involves, as a p r i m a r y element, the n o tion of a m e m o r y trace, and the w a y this element figures in A r m s t r o n g ' s a rgument r e n ders it unsuccessful.
R a d f o r d does not show that, even t h ough he is conce r n e d w i t h k n o w i n g that p w h i c h does not r e q u i r e consc i o u s conviction, he need not be concerned w i t h b e l i eving that p w h i c h also does
I show e l s e w h e r e 1 that, in d e s c r i b i n g someone as r e t a i n i n g a c o g n i t i v e ability, such as the a b i l i t y to a n swer certain questions correctly, there is no forced r e f e r e n c e to such causal m e c h a n i s m s as m e m o r y traces.
A c cordingly, as I shall ex p l a i n in section VII, we can try to r e c o n s t r u c t A r m s t r o n g 's four cases simply in terms of acquiring, r e t a i n i n g and e x e r cising the r e l e v a n t cognitive abilities.
For w h a t e v e r we a c c o m p l i s h c a nnot be u n d e r m i n e d by the success or fail u r e of a causal a nalysis of these abilities themselves in terms of m e m o r y traces.
Therefore, in s ection VIII I shall c o m p l e t e l y r e c o n s t r u c t A r m s t r o n g ' s four cases in terms of b e l i e f -c o n s t i t u t i n g a b i l i ties. In the process I d e fend the only p r o b l e m a t i c f o r m of the ent a i l m e n t thesis, namely, that k n o w i n g that p w h i c h does not r e q u i r e consc i o u s c o n v i c t i o n entails b e l i e v i n g that p w h i c h also does not re q u i r e such conviction. And, finally, I shall r e v e a l in section IX h o w R a d f o r d 's failure to account p r o p e r l y for the h i s t o r y of the s u b j e c t 's b e l i e f -c o n s t i t u t i n g a b i l i t y , 2 an element of prime importance in m y reconstr u c t i o n , u l t i m a t e l y leads to his refutation.
3 II.
In " K n o w l e d g e -By Examples" R a d f o r d constructs an example in w h i c h a F r e n c h -C a n a d i a n , Jean, is asked some luM e m o r y U n c h a i n e d A g ain," f o r t h c o m i n g in Analysis, X XXVI (1975-6) .
2 "Does U n w i t t i n g K n o w ledge E n tail U n c o n s c i o u s Belief?" A n a l y s i s , XXX (1969-70), pp. 103-7.
P a r e n t h e t i c a l page r e f e r e n c e s to R a d f o r d in this s e c tion will be to this article. incor r e c t ones" (495).1
But Lehrer could not m e a n here, as m i g h t be s u g g e s t e d by his use of the phrase 'no i d e a ' , just that J e a n is not awa r e that his answer is correct, and t h e r e fore that J e a n w o u l d not since r e l y say that it is correct. Nor, alte r n a t i v e l y , could he m e a n just that Jean is not aware that he has the a b i l i t y to a n s w e r the q u e s t i o n correctly.
For by doing so Lehr e r w o u l d surely beg the q u e s t i o n at issue. This leaves us w i t h the p r o b l e m of u n d e r s t a n d i n g ho w Lehrer uses the p h r a s e 'unable to t e l l ' . His cla i m could not be that J e a n does not have the a b i l i t y to answer the q u e s t i o n correctly, for Jean's h a v i n g such an a bility is p r e s upposed by his own argument.
(Jean knows the correct a n swer to the question.)
Consequently, I suggest that Lehrer means to cla i m that Jean is not justi f i e d to answ e r the f o l lowing quest i o n s a ffirmatively:
Is your a n swer to the q u e s tion correct?
Or, can you answ e r the q u e s t i o n correctly? By saying that J e a n is not j u s t i f i e d to a n s w e r such q u estions affi r m a t i v e l y , I do not m e a n to suggest only that he does not b e lieve that his a n s w e r is correct or that he has the abil i t y to answer Tom's ques t i o n correctly.
I also m e a n to suggest that he has no g o o d r e a s o n to b e l i e v e this.
Or again, in Radfo r d ' s terms, Jean n e i t h e r knows, nor is justified to claim, that he knows that E l i z a b e t h died in 1603.
If this is what Lehrer's cla i m a m ounts to, and I can see no alternative,2 then in itself it carries no force as an argu m e n t ag a i n s t Radford.
On the contrary, it lends some m e a s u r e of support to his position, by r e v e a l i n g the s i g n i ficance and s t r e n g t h of his denial, on the basis of his c o m pe l l i n g example, that in ord e r to know that E l i z a b e t h died in 1603, Jean should know, or be j u s t ified to claim, that he knows that E l i z a b e t h died in 1603.
This sort of p r o b l e m is r e p e a t e d l y e m b e d d e d in L e h r e r 's argument®.
For instance, Lehrer has this to say about his own quiz show example:
"-Assuming that G e o r g e was gue s s i n g , however, then, a l t h o u g h we m i g h t concede that Geor g e knows the c orrect answer, we should w a n t to insist that he did not know that E l i z a b e t h died in 1603.
A lucky guess is -*-Lehrer now admits that an a s s u m p t i o n ■ under l i e s his a r g u m e n t s in "Belief and Knowledge," a l t h o u g h he does not see the a s s u m p t i o n as I do here and in the follo w i n g section. See s e ction IV below.
2
Indeed, this sort of c l a i m is also r e q u i r e d by Lehrer's "proof" of the en t a i l m e n t thesis.
See the following section.
F-2 not a case of k n owing that p" (496),
I agr e e w i t h Lehrer that a lucky guess is not a di s p l a y of knowing, but w h y m o v e f r o m this to the cla i m that G e orge does not know?
If George act u a l l y g u esses that p, he is c learly not justified in claim ing that he knows that p . The reasons upon whi c h he bases his answer, if indeed there are any such r e asons (for there need not be), are not t hought to be, nor need they be, good ones.
But, on the o t h e r hand, George m a y h a v e u n d e r e s t i m a t e d h i m s e l f and his r e s o u r c e s , or m a y not have been in a context i deally suited to u t i l i z i n g his r e s o u r c e s fully. That is to say, George may still know that p.
For suppose that the quiz m a s t e r asks G e o r g e w h e t h e r some complex al g e b r a t h e o r e m is provable. G e orge is in no p o s i tion to try to prove this theorem.
Suppose as w e l l that he does not reca l l w h e t h e r he had ever p r oven that p a r t i c u l a r theorem.
So he guesses, and m e r e l y by chance the answ e r is correct.
Does Geor g e k n o w w h e t h e r the t h e o r e m is provable? L e hrer wo u l d be f o r c e d to say that he does not know.
But sup pose even f u r t h e r that George sits down w i t h pencil and paper aft e r the quiz show and proves the theorem.
Does George kno w then?
A n d suppose f i n a l l y that he had once p r o v e n the t h e o rem, and that he had the a b i l i t y to prove it all along, even d u ring the quiz show w h e n he guessed. D i d George know all along? Surely, this is the que s t i o n at issue h e r e , 1 and Lehrer cannot just stipulate an a n s w e r as he has done so far.
A f t e r all, at this point we mig h t accept that George's ab i l i t y to prove the theorem, an a b ility w h i c h he p o s s e s s e d at the time that he guessed, constitutes his knowl e d g e that the t h e o r e m is provable.
We cannot, of course, accept this if we a llow that in order to k n o w George should be j u s t i f i e d in claiming to know.
Yet if we all o w this, we are a p p a r e n t l y denying k n o w l e d g e to m a t h e m a t i c i a n s who could not remember w h i c h t heorems they h a d once prov e n and still could prove. C o n s e quently, we must turn to Lehrer's "proof" of the e n tailment thesis to see if he can supply the m i s s i n g arguments for his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of Radford's and his own examples. 10ne m i g h t say that G e orge knows how to pro v e the t h e o r e m but not that the t h e o r e m is p r o v a b l e , but this same shift applies to R a d f o r d ' s example: one mig h t say that Jean knows h o w to answer c o r r e c t l y but not that his answer is correct. This shift is thus the heart of the issue in question.
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III.
Lehrer's "proof" is as follows; (5) If S does not b e l i e v e that p, then S does not b e l i e v e that he knows that p. (6) If S does not beli e v e that he knows that p, then, even t h o u g h S co r r e c t l y says that p and knows that he has said that p, S does not kn o w th a t he c o r r e c t l y says that p. (7) If, even t h o u g h S co r r e c t l y says that p and knows that he has said that p, S does not know that he cor r e c t l y says that p, then S does not kn o w that p. Rad f o r d does suggest at the end of his article that perhaps (5) holds, yet prior to that point he argues not that CB") holds but r a t h e r that one r e a son among others for S's not b e l i e v i n g that he knows that p could be his not b e l i e v i n g that p.
In any event, R a dford could accept (5), e s p e c i a l l y if he assumes, as Lehrer does, that S is the ki n d of p erson w h ose beliefs are c o n s i s t e n t . 1 Setting (5) aside, we find that the first crucial a r g u me n t is given in support of (6):
"The r e a s o n for adopting this p r e m i s e is simply that if a m a n does not bel i e v e that he knows that p, then, even if he cor r e c t l y says that p and knows he has said thisin a quiz, for example -he should, if he is honest, not say he knows that his ans w e r is correct.
If we ask such a man, 'Do you k n o w w h e t h e r the a nswer you have given is correct?' the only right answer is 'No'" (497, my underlining). This p a s s a g e again reveals the w a y in w h i c h Lehrer r e p e a t e d l y blurs the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n a m a n's being justified in c l a i m i n g to "*"David A n n i s ' r e ply to Lehrer, "A Note on Lehrer's Proof that Kno w l e d g e ent a i l s Belief" (A n a l y s i s , XX I X (1968-69), pp. 207-8), turns on the fact that, ac c o r d i n g to Lehrer's proof, k n o w i n g entails b e l i e v i n g that one knows. Annis claims that this e n tailment does not obtain, for his fouryear old n e p h e w can be said to kn o w that his favorite toy is his but cannot be said to b e l i e v e that he knows this b e c ause he has no c o n c e p t i o n of knowledge.
Even if the nephew's beliefs could be supposed to be consistent, this sort of c l aim wou l d not u n dermine L e h r e r 's a r g u m e n t . Lehrer could simply eli m i n a t e (5) and r e p l a c e the antec e d e n t of (6) w i t h 'If S does not bel i e v e that p', and his a r g u m e n t for (6) could still be g i v e n w i t h the same change as in (6) itself, as should be c l ear after I discuss the argum e n t for ( 
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k n o w that p and his bei n g rig h t in c laiming to k n o w that p. If we inter p r e t the last q u e s t i o n in the quote as e q u i v a lent to "Do you k n o w that p?", the only justi f i e d a n s w e r is "No," or even m o r e precisely, "I don't c l a i m to,"l for I agree that, if a p e r s o n does not b e l i e v e that he knows that p, he is not justified in cla i m i n g to k n o w that p.
Only if we do as I suggest in Section II abo v e and interpret the last q u e s tion in the qu o t e as eq u i v a l e n t to, say, "Do you k n o w that you k n o w that p?" can we c o n s i d e r "No" as the right answer. Otherwise, the right answ e r is "Yes," or so Ra d f o r d w o u l d argue. Consequently, Lehrer's a rgument collapses.
We should n e v e r t h e l e s s c o n s i d e r Lehrer's argu m e n t for (7): "This a s s u m p t i o n rests on the fact that if a man c o r r e c t l y says that p and knows that he has said that p , then all he needs to k n o w in or d e r to know that he co r r e c t l y says that p is simply to k n o w that p" (497).
But what does Lehrer m e a n here w h e n he says that someone knows that |>? Obviously, he mea n s m o r e t h a n that the p e r s o n has an a p p r o p r i a t e l y a c q u i r e d a b ility to a n s w e r c e r t a i n questions c o r rectly, for o t h e r w i s e his a rgument wou l d be otiose. G i v e n Lehrer's argum e n t s for r e j e c t i n g (3) and a d o p t i n g (6), the m i s s i n g c o n d i t i o n could be that the p e r s o n believes, or is able to tell, that he has such an ability.
But we cannot just acce p t this sort of c o n d i t i o n w i t h o u t some j u s t i f i c a tion f r o m Lehrer. For his oppon e n t s w o u l d contend b o t h that
all S needs to h a v e in ord e r to know that p is an a p p r o p r i ate l y a c q u i r e d ab i l i t y to a n s w e r c e r t a i n questions c o r r e c t l y (or perhaps, an a b i l i t y to show that p), and that S's h a v ing such an ab i l i t y does not depe n d upon his believing, or upon his being able to tell, that he has it.
That is to say, if S can satisfy us that he has such an ability, even t h ough he h i m s e l f does not r e a l i z e his own capacity, then it is the q u e s t i o n at issue w h e t h e r or not he knows that p. 
3
P a r e n t h e t i c a l page r e f e r e n c e s to L e h r e r in this section will be to this article. 
Lehrer b e g i n s by claiming that R a dford assumes that "a m a n knows s o m e t h i n g that he is not c o n s c i o u s l y c o n vinced of or rea d y to assert" (136). Lehrer t h e n wishes to show that Ra d f o r d cannot c omplete his arg u m e n t w i t h o u t being u n f a i t h f u l to his so-called a s s u m p t i o n about the concept of k n o w l e d g e .
For R a d f o r d a s sumes that the m a n does not believe that p be c a u s e he says he is guessing.
This does now f o l l o w on the current assumption.
We h ave a ssumed that a m a n can k n o w or b e l i e v e that p even t h o u g h he lacks conscious con v i c t i o n that p and a readi n e s s to assert that p.... [U]nder the current assumption, a m a n may say in all sincerity that he n either bel i e v e s nor disb e l i e v e s that p, even though he does in fact be l i e v e that p, just as he m a y say that he does not know that p, even t h o u g h in fact he does k n o w that p (136, my underlining).
But w h o s e a s s u m p t i o n is it that is, accor d i n g to Lehrer, current? R a d f o r d does not a s sume that a m a n can beli e v e that p even t h o u g h he lacks conscious con v i c t i o n that p and a r e a d i n e s s to a s sert that p.
On the contrary, if he assumes anything, he assumes just the opposite.
Is he f o rced in some way by his so-ca l l e d a s s u m p t i o n about the c oncept of k n o w l e d g e to m a k e the same a s s u m p t i o n about the concept of belief, as L e h r e r 's argu m e n t implies? I do not see w h y this is so, but Lehrer a p p a r e n t l y thinks that it -is, for he w i shes "to argue that w h e t h e r or not one assumes that a conscious co n v i c t i o n that p and a r e a d i n e s s to assert that p in a p p r o p r i a t e circumstances are c o n d itions of k n o w l e d g e and belief, ... [the e n t a i l ment thesis] m a y be sustained." He thus p roceeds to mak e his a r g u m e n t first und e r the a s s u m p t i o n that b o t h k n owledge and b e l i e f ca r r y such conscious conviction, and then u nder the a s s u m p t i o n that n e i t h e r k n o w l e d g e nor b e l i e f carries such conscious c o n v i c t i o n (135-8).
In fact, the second 
F-6 a s s u m p t i o n is the current a s s u m p t i o n to w h i c h L e hrer refers
N e v e r t h e l e s s L ehrer's a r g u m e n t does suggest a w eakness in R a d f o r d ' s position: R a d f o r d m e r e l y assumes that he need not be conce r n e d w i t h beli e f w h i c h does not carry conscious c o n v i c t i o n and, consequently, w h i c h m i g h t not be e xternal to
Jean ' s knowledge.
But Lehrer does not act u a l l y m a k e clear that this w e a k n e s s is fatal to Radfo r d ' s position. 
For R a d ford m i g h t just be able to show that there is no such be l i e f w h i c h is not ext e r n a l to Jean's knowledge, or perhaps that there are no i m p r e s s i v e grounds in o r d i n a r y language for such belief. A t -this point A r m s t r o n g ' s reply to R a d f o r d in "Does
Jean knows that E l i z a b e t h died in 1603. (10) Jean ne i t h e r knows, nor believes, that he knows that E l i z a b e t h died in 1603. (11) J e a n bel i e v e s that it is not the case that El i z a b e t h died in 1603. A r m s t r o n g c l e a r l y accepts R a d f o r d ' s cla i m that (9) is true, but he also tries to show that the context as d e s c r i b e d is c o m p a t i b l e w i t h a f o u r t h sentence, namely, (12) Jean b e l ieves that it is the case that E l i z a b e t h died in 1603.
If these four sentences are c o m p a t i b l e (and it w o u l d seem at first glance r a t h e r u n l i k e l y that they are), then Radford's a r g u ment is inconclusive, and A r m s t r o n g can try to show that (12) is true. The first step is to poi n t out that (11) does not imply the n e g a t i o n of (12). P a r e n t h e t i c a l page r e f e r e n c e s to A r m s t r o n g w i l l be to this article. We are thus co n f r o n t e d by a c o n t e n t i o n quite like L e h r e r 's, a l t h o u g h here it seems to bear the w e i g h t r e q u i r e d of it.
F-7 [T]here is no e n t a ilment here. For it is p o s s i b l e that you have a split m i n d on the issue, It is at least l o g i c a l l y p o s s i b l e that you hold c o n t r a d i c t o r y beliefs s i m u l t a n e o u s l y , ,,, The simul t a n e o u s h o l d i n g of c o n t r a d i c t o r y beliefsis not a c o n t r a d i c t o r
Normally, if not always, a p e r s o n wou l d h a v e no d i f f i c u l t y deci d i n g that the beliefs r e p r e s e n t e d by sentences (11) and (12) are inconsistent, and c o n s e q u e n t l y d e c i d i n g w h i c h of the two b eliefs to hold. A n t i c i p a t i n g this problem, A r m s t r o n g contends: "[I]t is clear that one of the b eliefs --the belief that E l i z a b e t h died in 1603 --wou l d have to be one that its p o s s e s s o r was not
Yet A r m s t r o n g 's a c count of the i n c o n c l u s i v e n e s s of R a d f o r d 's a r g u m e n t is itself i n a d equate and misleading, It is m i s l e a d i n g be c a u s e we can r e m a i n f aithful to R a d f o r d 's example even if we c l a i m eith e r that (11) is false, or that, if the beli e f r e p r e s e n t e d by (11) is to carry consc i o u s conviction, then (11) will be false. Since Jean may p rofess to have no o p i n i o n about his answers one way or the other, even a c c o r d i n g to A r m s t r o n g (27), we should look e l s e w h e r e for what forces the belief r e p r e s e n t e d by (12) not to carry conscious c o n viction.
Thus, A r m s t r o n g ' s ac c o u n t of the i n c o n c l u s i v e n e s s is also inadequate.
If we h a v e J e a n say, "I do not b e l i e v e that E l i z a b e t h died in 1603," A r m s t r o n g m u s t c h a l l e n g e Jean by arguing that his saying this does not j u stify the c l a i m that he does not b e lieve that E l i z a b e t h died in 1603; it justifies only the c laim that he bel i e v e s that he does not believe that E l i z a b e t h died in 1603.
Not o n l y do we assu m e that the latter cla i m is true by c h a l l e n g i n g Jean in this way, but we also assume that the belief 255
F-8 r e p r e s e n t e d by that c l a i m carries conscious conviction. This is m o s t likely the best bas i s for the c o n c l u s i o n that, if the b e l i e f r e p r e s e n t e d by (12) is to car r y conscious c o n viction, t h e n (12) w i l l be false.
For if this c o n c l u s i o n were false, J e a n would, in effect, c o n s c i o u s l y b e l i e v e both that he does believe, and that he does not believe, that E l i z a b e t h died in 1603.
Consequently, the b e l i e f r e p r e sented by (12) R a d f o r d does not ant i c i p a t e this sort of r e s p o n s e to his example, and so A r m s t r o n g is r ight in thinking that he can try to show that J e a n does after all b e l i e v e that E l i z a b e t h died in 1603.
VI. A r m s t r o n g considers the same sort of context that R a d f o r d does.
A n examinee is asked w h e n Queen Eli z a b e t h died, and he a n swers w i t h w h a t he thinks is a guess. The exa m i n e e was once taught the correct a n s w e r to the question, i.e., "1603," and there was a m e m o r y trace created as a r e s u l t of his be i n g taught this.
A r m s t r o n g outlines four va r i a t i o n s on this basic c o ntext by specifying a d d i t i o n a l f eatures of the crea t i o n and s u b s equent h i s t o r y of the m e m o r y trace:
(I) the m e m o r y trace is " c o mpletely c a u s a l l y irrelevant" to the e x a m i n e e 's giving an a n swer that just ha p p e n s to be correct, and the actual h i s t o r y of the m e m o r y trace is thus irrelevant; (II) the m e m o r y trace is "ca u s a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e " for the e x a m i n e e 's giving the correct answer; (III) the m e m o r y trace o r g i n a l l y encoded '1 6 0 3 ' but dege n e r ated to encode '1 3 0 6 ' and it is the latter trace that is "causally r e s p o n s i b l e " for the e x a m inee's giving the in correct. a n s w e r "1306"; and (IV) the m e m o r y trace ini t i a l l y encoded '1306' (and thus the exa m i n e e ne v e r r e a l l y learned the correct answer) but d e g e n e r a t e d to encode '1603', and it is the latter trace that is "causally respon s 1306'" (31). A l t h o u g h this pa s s a g e is m e a n t to support A r m s t r o n g ' s c l a i m that case (III) is a case of false belief, it does no m o r e than interject the subject's aware n e s s of his b e lief b e t w e e n the f o r m a t i o n of that be l i e f and his a n swer to the question. This is no help to us, for we w i s h to learn w h y A r m s t r o n g says that the subject believes at all (not to m e n t i o n any d i f f i c u l t y A r m s t r o n g m i g h t have in  e x p l a i n i n g h o w the m e m o r y trace, r a t h e r t h a n the subject's  being aware of his belief, is c asually r e s p o n s i b l e for the  subject's r e p l y i n g as he did) . A r m s t r o n g ' s c l a i m that, as a r e sult of a per s o n ' s m e m o 
How then shall we interpret
Consequently, being fair to Radf o r d w o u l d e x clude m a k i n g the case IV additions to his example, a l t h o u g h this, in itself does not m e a n that A r m s t r o n g cannot s u c c e s s f u l l y m a k e the rest of his argument.
G i v e n A r m s t r o n g ' s terms, there will still be no way to d i f f e r e n t i a t e cases (II) and (IV) at the time the examinee answers the question; the two m e m o r y traces both encode '1603', and the answers are identical.
The d i f f erence b e tween the two cases lies solely in the past h i s t o r y of the two m e m o r y traces, and this supplies A r m s t r o n g with a basis for the follo w i n g conclusion: "[T]he object of the two puta t i v e cogni t i v e states [in cases (II) and (IV)] is the same v i z . , 'Elizabeth died in 1603'. A s s u m i n g that these are cases of k n o w l e d g e and belief, res p e c t i v e l y , do not the two cogni t i v e states have a common factor? A n d what can that c o m m o n fact o r be except that in both cases the subject believes that E l i z a b l e t h died in 1603" (33)?
But what can that common f a c t o r be except that in both cases the subject has a m e mm o r y trace w h i c h encodes '1603' and wou l d be caus a l l y r e sponsible for his a n s w e r i n g "1603" to a p p r o p r i a t e questions? I see no alternative.
Consequently, our c o ncern about the r e l a t i o n s h i p betw e e n h o l d i n g a beli e f and having a m e m o r y trace is well founded, for if the common f a c t o r is n o t h i n g but h a v i n g a certain m e m o r y trace, A r m s t r o n g ' s i n t r o d u c t i o n of m e m o r y traces in or d e r to m a k e the "causal m e c h a n i s m s .... e x p l i c i t " (3 0) needs to be defended. The f o l l o w i n g q u e s t i o n s expose the weakn e s s e s in A r m s t r o n g 's a r g u m e n t : (a) What cons t i t u t e s the k n o w l e d g e state in case (II)? (b) Why is the c o mmon factor of the two cases (necessarily) an element of the knowl e d g e state in case (II)? (c) Why is it, or is it, in any way n e c e s s a r y for R a d f o r d to have the causal m e c h a n i s m s m a d e explicit? (d) Are there in fact any causal m e c h a n i s m s to m a k e explicit? In order for A r m s t r o n g ' s arg u m e n t to show that knowing entails believing, the c o n s i d e r a t i o n of r e m e m b e r i n g , or at least of m e m o r y traces, must s omehow be essen t i a l to R a d ford's arg u m e n t that his example is a case of knowledge, for o t h e r w i s e k n o w i n g need not entail the sort of believing w h i c h A r m s t r o n g specifies in terms of m e m r o y traces. That is to say, if in saying that Jean knows that E l i z a b e t h died in 1603 there is no forced r e f e r e n c e to m e m o r y traces or the like, and if in saying that Jean believes that Eli z a b e t h died in 1603 there is a forced r e f e r e n c e to m e m o r y traces (and this is apparently what A r m s t r o n g is claiming), then the so-called c o mmon factor is external to the k n o wledge in case (II), and A r m s t r o n g ' s a rgument fails.
VII.
A r m s t r o n g m i g h t support his a rgument in the f o l l o w ing way. We a l r e a d y k n o w that Jean gives the c o rrect an s w e r to the ques t i o n as to when E l i z a b e t h died, and that he answers other questions in an i m p r e s s i v e l y supportive p a t t e r n w h i c h compels us to say that his c o r r e c t answer is no fluke:
he has the ability, w h i c h he exercises in the example, to an swer the q u e s t i o n correctly.
Even if we cannot agree that his exe r c i s i n g the a b i l i t y c o n stitutes rememb e r i n g , we cer t a i n l y can agree that he has had the ab i l i t y for at least some time, or rather, that he has r e t a i n e d it.
A c c o r d i n g to m a n y m e m o r y theorists, for example, C. B. M a r t i n and M a x D e u t s c h e r , ! we cannot u n d e r s t a n d this sort of r e t e n t i o n w i t h o u t m a k i n g r e f erence to such c a usal m e c h a n i s m s as m e m o r y traces. Therefore, the c o n s i d e r a t i o n of remem b e r i n g , or at least of m e m o r y traces, is e s s e ntial to R a d f o r d ' s argument, and the so-called common f a c t o r in cases (II) and (IV) is not e x t e r n a l to the k n owledge in case (IV).
Radford h i m s e l f w o u l d rep l y to this arg u m e n t by claiming that, if Jean's p e r f o r m a n c e is s u f f i c i e n t l y impressive, his k n o w i n g some E n g l i s h h i s t o r y can be infe r r e d simply and i m m e d i a t e l y f r o m his performance. A c c o r d i n g l y , there is no f o rced r e f e r e n c e to the h i s t o r y of Jean's a b i l i t y to give the p e rformance, and t h e r e f o r e no f o rced r e f e r e n c e to m e m o r y t r a c e s .
But this type of r e p l y is not only wrong, as I show in s ection IX below, but also unnecessary, as I show in "Memory U n c h a i n e d Again.My foil the r e is Sydney Shoemaker's c l a i m that the n o t i o n of memory, as w e l l as that of retention, play some sort of special role w h i c h r e q u i r e t h e m to be given a c a usal a n a l y s i s . 3
In
d e f e n d i n g his claim Shoemaker criticizes Roger Squires' r e j e c t i o n of M a r t i n and Deut s c h e r ' s causal a nalysis of r e m e m b e r i n g ,^ but he n e v e r t h e l e s s fails to a p p r e c i a t e the force of Squires' position:
simply put, there is no f o r c e d r e f e r e n c e to c a usal m e c h a n i s m s or c o n nections in d e s c r i b i n g someone as h a ving stayed the same in a certain way, such as by r e t a i n i n g an ability.
If we suppose, for example, that J e a n a c q u i r e d the a b i l i t y to give the correct a n swer by listening to a t e a c h e r some time ago, then all that we need tô 
F-12 say to c onnect his p resent c orrect a n swer to his l i s t e n i n g is that he r e t a i n e d the a b i l i t y he acqu i r e d by l i s t e n i n g un t i l he e x e r c i s e d it in g i v i n g the correct answer.
We need not say, as Shoemaker, and M a r t i n and D e u t s c h e r do, that his listening is c a u s a l l y n e c e s s a r y for his p resent correct answer.
Yet in " M emory U n c h a i n e d Agai n " I also point out that, once we r e m o v e the t e n d e n c y to see a causal component as e n t e r ing via the n o tion of the r e t e n t i o n of an ability, it is open to us to see one as entering v i a the n o tion of acquiring, exercising, or m e r e l y h a ving an ability, 
I take this to be A r m s t r o n g 's central pr o j e c t in A M a t e r i a l i s t T h e o r y of the M i n d " [T]he concept of a m e n t a l state is
t a i n i n g such a state, so that no fu r t h e r causal m e c h anisms or c o n nections are r e q u i r e d to ac c o u n t for r e t e n t i o n here.) This ana l y s i s fits w e l l w i t h w h a t I say in the p r e ceding section about A r m s t r o n g 's n o t i o n of unco n s c i o u s b e lief.
H o w e v e r , even t h o u g h we mig h t be able to salvage a causal a nalysis of r e m e m b e r i n g in this way, and t h e r e b y to support A r m s t r o n g ' s a rgument against Radford, we w o u l d also be carried far b e y o n d a m e r e a nalysis of r e m e m b e r i n g and into a causal analysis of c o g n i t i v e abilities in general.
These two a n a l y ses w o r k at d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s . We can p r o c e e d to analyze r e m e m b e r i n g simply in terms of acquiring, r e t a i n i n g and e x e r c i s i n g an a p p r o p r i a t e ability.
If it turns out that A r m s t r o n g is rig h t in t h i n k i n g that there is a f o rced r e f erence to some sort of casual m e c h a n i s m in d e s c r i b i n g someone as being able to do something, then we should incorporate this p a r t i c u l a r analysis of h a v i n g abili t i e s into our a n a l y sis of remembering.
But this i n c o r p o r a t i o n could in no way undermine, what we had a l ready a c c o m p l i s h e d in ana l y z i n g r e m e m b e r i n g .
Furthermore, we can say the same thing about A r m s t r o n g 's four cases.
If we can r e c o n s t r u c t t h e m s i mply in terms of J e a n 's acquiring, r e t a i n i n g and ex e r c i s i n g a p p r o p r i a t e a b i l i ties, then w h a t e v e r we do on that basis cannot be u n d e r m i n e d by the a c c e p t a n c e or r e j e c t i o n of a causal a nalysis of h a v i n g (Londonj.v'.'Soat'ie^ge-and Keg a n Paul, 1968), p. 82.
abilities.
It turns out that this r e c o n s t r u c t i o n also a f fords us a solid basis for de f e n d i n g the e n t a i l m e n t thesis and for c r i t i c i z i n g R a d f o r d 's examples and arguments.
VIII. I shall now r e c o n s t r u c t A r m s t r o n g 's fo u r cases:
Case (I):
(a) Someone teaches J e a n the date of E l i z a b e t h 's death and, as a result, J e a n learns (gets to know) the date of E l i z a b e t h 's death. That is to say, Jean can now a n s w e r the q u e s t i o n "When did E l i z a be t h die?" (Call the q u e s t i o n 'Q *.) Or again, Je a n has a c q uired the ability to a n s w e r Q correctly.
(Call the a b ility 'A ' , and the correct answer, "Elizabeth died in 1603," 'P '.) (b) J e a n retains A at least until T o m asks Jean Q.
(c)
W h e n Tom asks Je a n Q, Je a n answers P, but in d o ing so Jean does not, even u n w i ttingly, exercise A -he m e r e l y g u e s s e s .1
Case ( I I ) : (a) As in Case (I) (a). (b) As in Case (I) (b). (c)
When T o m asks Je a n Q, Je a n answers P, and he thinks that he is m e r e l y gue s s i n g
Obviously, I do not use the wo r d 'a b i l i t y ' here so that s o m e o n e 's m e r e l y d o ing X entails his h aving the a b i l i t y to do X and thus entails his exer c i s i n g the abi l i t y to do X. This allows me to say that J e a n 's a nswer P is not given as a r e s u l t of his ex e r c i s i n g A.
(Of course, for certain p e r f ormances, b ringing th e m off may e n t a i l h a v i n g the abil i t y to do so. See the f o l l o w i n g section.)
To i l lustrate what I m e a n here, I offer the f o l l o w i n g example: w i t h o u t ai m i n g at all, a ski l l e d m a r k s m a n hits the b u l l 's eye (because the w i n d blows the b u l l e t into the bull's-eye); or, by a iming c a r e l e s s l y (jokingly) at a rock, a skilled m a r k s m a n hits the b u l l ' s -e y e w i t h out, even u n w i ttingly, e x e r c i s i n g his abi l i t y to do sohis h i t t i n g the b u l l 's eye is a fluke or a total a c c i d e n t .
but a c t u a l l y he is u n w i t t i n g l y exer c i s i n g A , 1
Case ( I I I ) :
(a) As in Case (I) (a), (b) J e a n does not r e t a i n A until Tom asks Q; his m e m o r y b e comes m u d d l e d in such a way t h a t , r a t h e r than h a ving the ab i l i t y to a n swer Q correctly, he has instead the a b i l i t y to a n swer Q i n c orrectly by saying, " E l i zabeth died in 1306." Or he has instead the a b ility to give what is in fact a w r o n g a n s w e r to Q, namely, " E l i zabeth died in 1306." (Call the a b i l i t y 'Aw', and the incorrect a n s w e r 'Pw'.)
Jean retains A w at least until T o m asks h i m Q. (c)
W h e n T o m asks J e a n Q J e a n answers Pw, and he thinks that he is m e r e l y g uessing but a c t u a l l y he is u n w i t t i n g l y exercising Aw.
Case (IV): (a) Someone t e aches (tries to teach) Jean the date of E l i z a b e t h ' s death, but Jean does not learn the date of E l i zabeth's d e a t hhe (mis-) learns instead that E l i z a b e t h died in 1306.
That is to say, Jean has a c q u i r e d the ab i l i t y to a n swer Q incor-ir e ctly by saying, "E l i z a b e t h died in 1306." Or again, J e a n has acquired'Aw. 
When I say that Jean u n w i t t i n g l y exercises A, I could just as w e l l say that, w i t h o u t r e a l i z i n g it, Jean is r e m e m b e r i n g w h e n E l i z a b e t h died.
This sort of thing can h a p p e n w i t h r e s p e c t to m a n y d i f f erent sorts of abilities.
Suppose that once I was a g o o d golfer, but I have not p l a y e d for y e a r s , and thus I t h i n k that I no longer have the a b i l i t y to hit golf balls c o n s i s t e n t l y down the m i d d l e of the fairway.
Yet w h e n I hit the first few balls, they all land quite n e a r the m i d d l e of the fairway, and e v e n t u a l ly I r ealize that I nev e r lost my a b i l i t y to hit golf balls well --indeed, I even u n w i t t i n g l y e x e r c i s e d it in hitt i n g m y first f e w balls.
The basis for this r e c o n s t r u c t i o n is that the p h r a s e 'can a nswer Q' is o f t e n used as a p a r a p h r a s e of 'knows the answer to Q'.
Of course, in using the f ormer phrase, by 'answer' we mean 'answer correctly', and I thus r e n d e r the former p hrase by 'has the abi l i t y to a n s w e r Q correctly' or b y 1'has A'.
But then in (III) (b) it m a y seem a w k w a r d to continue using the base e x p r e s s i o n 'has the abi l i t y to an s w e r Q', W h e n we say that Je a n no longer has the a b i l i t y to a nswer Q c o r rectly, but has instead the abil i t y to a nswer Q incorrectly, we say s o m ething q u ite odd. W h y be so generous and still call what Jean has 'an ability'?
Why not simply say that Jean tends to give Pw in a n s w e r to Q? But even t hough saying this appears to fit n i c e l y w i t h what A r m s t r o n g says about Case (III), we should not be tem p t e d to do so, as I shall show in the rest of this section. A r m s t r o n g ' s c l a i m that Case (I) does not seem to be a case e i t h e r of k n o w l e d g e or of b elief is well founded to the extent that, if Je a n fails to a n s w e r Q cor r e c t l y often enough, we m i ght be f orced to conclude that he could n o t , after a l l , have A, If a p e r s o n who claims that he is a skilled m a r k s m a n fails to hit the bull ' s -e y e often enough, we m i g h t be forced to conclude, at the very least, that he could not be what he p r o fesses to be.
Gilb e r t Ryle provides the fol l o w i n g j u s t i f i c a t i o n for dra w i n g such a conclusion: "[W]
hen we say of a p e r s o n that he can bring off things of a certain sort,, such as solve anagr a m s or cure sciatica, we m e a n that he can be re l i e d on to succeed r e a s o n a b l y often even w i t h o u t the aid of luck.
He knows how to bring it off in n ormal s i t u a t i o n s ."1 This j u s t i f i c a t i o n is not c o m p l e t e l y successful, however, for it blurs the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t ween someone's being able to bring off things of a certain sort and someone's tending, or being prone, to bring off things of a cer t a i n sort.
For Ryle, wh e n we say that someone tends to bring off things of a cer t a i n sort, we mean, roughly, that it is a good bet that he will bring off such things (131). He has the ab i l i t y to hit the b u l l 's-eye, but it need not be the case that he can be reli e d on to hit the b u l l 's-eye r e a s o n a b l y oft e n w i t h o u t the aid of luck, because he m a y not try to do so very o f t e n or at all, (This is, I suppose, the r e ason w h y Ryle points out that, in order to d e t e rmine w h e t h e r or not a p e r s o n 's shot is a fluke, we m u s t c onsider not only his s hooting record, but also "his e x p lanations and e x c u s e s , the advi c e he gave to his n e i g h bor and a host of o t h e r clues of various sorts" (45-6).) Ryle does say, " 'tends t o ' implies 'c a n ' , but is not implied by it" (131), and p e rhaps I can make this explicit by r e n d e ring 'he tends to b r i n g it o f f ' by 'it is a good bet that he will di s p l a y his ab i l i t y to bring it off'. But, of course, if a p e r s o n simply has the a b i l i t y to b r i n g it off, it need not be a good bet that he will d i splay his ability, that is, unless he tries to bring it off.
We m i g h t thus r e nder 'he can bring it o f f ' by 'it is a good bet that he will display his a b i l i t y to bring it off, if he tries'.
A c c o r d i n g l y , the a p p a r e n t awkw a r d n e s s of (III) (b) should be r e m o v e d by r e n d e r i n g it in the f o l l o w i n g way: J e a n does not r e tain A until Tom asks h i m Q ; his m e m o r y becomes m u d dled in such a w a y that it is no longer a good bet that he will answer Q w i t h P if he tries to a n s w e r Q, but instead it is a good bet that J e a n w i l l answer Q with Pw if he tries to a n s w e r Q; it r e mains a g o o d bet that Jean w i l l a n swer Q w i t h Pw if he tries to a n swer Q, at least until T o m asks Jean Q.
R e n d e r i n g (III) (b) in this way r emoves its a p parent a w k w a r d n e s s w i t h o u t losing the sense of A r m s t r o n g 's Case (III), and w i t h o u t giving Case (III) a con s t r u c t i o n w h i c h is not analo g o u s to the other three cases.
In fact 1 1 I should ex p l a i n here that I am not trying to give a n y thing like a complete or d e f i n i t i v e a nalysis of havi n g a b i l i ties.
Rather, I a m t r ying to suggest one w a y to give such an analysis, so that I can p Or again, in Ch i s h o l m ' s terms, w h a t justifies J e a n (or anyone) in c o u n t i n g it as e vident that he believes t h a t P (Pw) is simply the fact that his b e h a v i o r constitutes the ty p i c a l b e h a v i o r a l m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of such a belief. Let us call this 'the n o n -s e l f -p r e s e n t i n g type of belief'.
Usually, the a rgument continues, when we say that Jean has a n o n -s e l f -p r e s e n t i n g b e l i e f that P, we mean, roughly, that it is a good bet that he will give P as an a n swer to appr o p r i a t e questions (whether or not he is aware that this is the case).
However, the a rgument continues further, there is good r e a s o n to extend what we m e a n w h e n we say that Jean has a n o n -s e l f -p r e s e n t i n g b e l i e f that P, so that Jean still has such a b e l i e f in case that it is a good bet that he will give P as an a n s w e r to a p p r o p r i a t e questions only if he tries to answer these quest i o n s (whether or not he is aware that this is the case).
The r e a s o n for this exten s i o n is that the latter type of n o n -s e l f -p r es e nting b e l i e f cannot and should not be sharply d
i s t i n gu i s h e d f r o m the f o r m e r type, even t h o u g h there is usua l l y t hought to be a clear d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n tendencies and c a p a c i t i e s .
A l t h o u g h there is, it can be agreed, a f ormally clear d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n te n d e n c i e s and capacities, that d i s t i n c tion should not be taken as grounds to elimi n a t e the second type of n o n -s e l f -p r e s e n t i n g belief, in as m u c h as w i t h r e spect to m a t t e r s of b e lief we place the stress on the fact that there is one p a r t i c u l a r way of a n s w e r i n g the a p p r o p r i a t e questions w h i c h has prime s i g n i f i c a n c e for Jean.
For bot h types of n o n -s e l f -p r e s e n t i n g belief, P has the r e q u i r e d F u r t h e r m o r e ? the f o r m a l l y clear d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n tend e n c i e s and capac i t i e s does not have in pr a c t i c e sufficient s i g n i f i c a n c e to eli m i n a t e the second type of nons e l f -p r e s e n t i n g belief. G i v e n that Jean once had a non.-selfp r e s e n t i n g b e l i e f of the first type and now only has one of the second type, no sharp d i v i d i n g line b e t w e e n these two phases of b e l i e f can be determined.
Perhaps it became less au t o m a t i c and m o r e of an effort for Jean to answer Q in a certain way, until now it takes some c o n s i d e r a b l e effort for Jean to a n s w e r Q in that way.
But s urely we can only a r b i t r a r i l y set the time w h e n his a n s w e r i n g Q in that w a y was no longer s u f f i c i e n t l y automatic, and was enough of an effort, so that he no l o n g e r had a n o n -s e l f -p r e s e n t i n g b elief of the first type.
We should simply say that Je a n had a n on-selfp r e s e n t i n g b e l i e f all a l o n g . C o n s e q u e n t l y , there are three key elements to c o nsider in m y r econstruction:
(i) w h e t h e r or not Je a n has the a b ility to a n s w e r Q in a cert a i n w a y (which need not be correctly), or w h e t h e r or not it is a good bet that Je a n wi l l answer Q in a cer t a i n w a y if he tries to a n s w e r Q; (ii) w h e t h e r or not the w a y in w h i c h J e a n is able to a nswer Q is correctly; and (iii) w h e t h e r or not J e a n 's a b i l i t y to answer Q was a c q u i r e d in a way w h i c h is a p p r o p r i a t e to (its constituting) knowledge. (1) a p e r son believes, p e r h a p s u n consciously, his a n s w e r to Q is true if and only if he has the a b i l i t y (which he exercises) to a n s w e r Q in the way he does, and (2) a p erson knows, perhaps "''This a r g u m e n t can be r e i n f o r c e d by n o t i n g that we w o u l d u s u a l l y say that Je a n acqui r e s the abi l i t y to a nswer Q w i t h Pw or that Je a n acqui r e s the b e l i e f that Pw, but not that Jean acquires the t e n d e n c y to a nswer Q w i t h Pw.
There is something odd about "acq u i r i n g a t endency," and we w o u l d u s u a l l y say something like this:
Jean d e v e l o p e d the t e n d e n c y to a nswer Q w i t h Pw, I trace this oddness to a d i f f e r e n c e between those things w h i c h we have p r i m a r i l y t h r o u g h our doing something (or t h r o u g h our choos i n g to do something) and those things w h i c h we have p r i m a r i l y t h r o u g h som e t h i n g h a p p e n i n g to u s . I w o u l d u s u a l l y place abi l i t i e s and beliefs in the f o r m e r group, and tend e n c i e s in the latter group.
If right, this suggests not only that the p r e c e d i n g a r g u m e n t is well founded, but also that the second type of n o n -s e l f -p r e s e n t i n g b elief is m ore basic than the first type, ther e b y p r o v i d i n g an even better f o u n d a t i o n for m y reconstruction.
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u n c o n s ciously, his answ e r to Q is true if and o n l y if his a n s w e r is true or correct, he has the a b i l i t y (which he exercises) to a n s w e r Q correctly, and he has a c q u It is a case of b e l i e f that P because Jean has the a b i l i t y (which he exercises) to a n s w e r Q in the way he does, v i z ., correctly.
And it is a case of knowledge that P be c a u s e Jean a n swers Q correctly, he has the a b i l i t y (which he exercises) to a n s w e r Q correctly, and he has a cquired that a bility in v i rtue of his h a v i n g been taught the date of E l i z a beth's death, or in a w a y w h i c h is a p p r o p r i a t e to knowledge. Furthermore, the b e lief that P is c learly not external to the k n o w l e d g e that P --knowing, as in (2), entails believing, as in (1). show that the way in w h i c h a b e l i e f -c o n s t i t u t i n g ab i l i t y is a c quired is a p p r o p r i a t e to k n o w l e d g e if and only if it i n stantiates, or is, w i t h re s p e c t to ju s t i f y i n g the belief c o n s t i t u t e d by that ability, f u n c t i o n a l l y e q u i valent to, w a r r a n t e d (and indefeasible) r e a s o n i n g to that belief. My argu m e n t there turns on h o w we can just i f i a b l y criticize the way in w h i c h a p e r s o n acquires a b e l i e f -c o n s t i t u t i n g ability in cases w h e r e no (obvious) r e a s o n i n g takes place.
IX. I shall now c o n s i d e r R a d f o r d ' s r e p l y to Armstro ng, "Does U n w i t t i n g
Compare G ilbert Harm a n ' s "Knowledge, Reasons, and Causes," Journal of P h i l o s o p h y , LXVII (1970), p p . 841-55, and T hought (Princeton, N. J . , P r i n c e t o n Univ. Press, 1973).
As I e xplain in Knowl e d g e and B e l i e f , e s p e c i a l l y in sections XII and XIV of Part One, my a c count of these cases is i m p o r t a n t l y different • f r o m H a r m a n 's . P a r e n t h e t i c a l page r e f e r e n c e s to R a dford m this section will be to this article. Furthermore, it is not the case that Armstrong's require ment that there should be some mechanism at work is shown to be otiose and vacuous because "no doubt, we can always find some mechanism at work which is responsible in the sense of being necessary for a subject's giving the answers that he gives, whatever they may be" (106). As I indicate in sections VI and VII above, Armstrong would argue that, when ever an ability to answer is exercised, a particular sort of mechanism, i.e., one that is causally responsible for the subject's producing certain behavior in these circumstances, must be at work. Thus, we are not looking for just any mechanism which is necessary for a subject's giving the answers that he does. Nor can we overlook the kind of answers that he gives, for they may not require that a mechanism of the specified sort is at work; after all, not all answers are manifestations of abilities to give them. And, lastly, for Radford it still makes sense to allow that even when the subject's answers are impressive no such mechanism is at work.l But allowing this can make sense only if Armstrong's causal analysis of having cognitive abilities fails, and there is no argument in Radford's article to show that it does. 
